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[30 August 2008] Forthcoming, Revue Internationale du Droit d’Auteur (July 2008)
Recent Developments in US Copyright Law: Part I – “Orphan” Works
--Jane C. Ginsburg, Columbia University School of Law*
Abstract
This Comment, after a brief review of the nature of the orphan
works problem and prior attempts to resolve it in the US, will
analyze the current bills’ provisions, both with respect to the
limitation of remedies that constitutes the proposals’ centerpiece,
and to the conditions required to qualify for the limitation. I will
also compare the US proposals with current European initiatives,
and will assess the compatibility of the US proposals with
international treaty norms, as well as the cross-border
consequences of inconsistent US and EU orphan works regimes. I
will conclude with some suggestions for amending the US
proposals to enhance their international compatibility and to
reconcile the interests of users more fully with those of the works’
creators.
This is the first of two Parts of Recent Developments in US Copyright Law since
2005. The current installment addresses legislative activity; the next installment (in the
October 2008 RIDA) will analyze the case law. No new copyright legislation has been
enacted since 2005.1 Many bills have been proposed, most of them unsuccessful or
unlikely of passage.2 One initiative, however, bears examination, because it concerns a
problem that has drawn attention in both the United States and the European Union.3
Moreover, it is probable that some solution will be enacted, albeit perhaps not by the
current Congress, whose Term expires at the end of 2008. The problem concerns the
exploitation of works whose authors or right holders cannot be located, more familiarly
known as “orphan works.” This Chronique, after a brief review of the nature of the
*

Many thanks for information concerning orphan works initiatives in the European Union to Tarja
Koskinen-Olsson, Honorary President of IFRRO – International Federation of Reproduction Rights
Organisations, who was a member of the Copyright Subgroup of the i2010 Digital Libraries High Level
Expert Group, and principal drafter of the Orphan Works section of the Subgroup’s Final Report, see infra
note 2. Thanks for research assistance to Emily Weiss, Columbia Law School JD class of 2009.
1
The most recently enacted law, the “Copyright Royalty Judges Program Technical Corrections Act,” P.L.
109-303, 109th Cong. 2d Sess, was passed in January 2006. As the title suggests, it concerns amendments
to the organization of the copyright royalty boards that administer compulsory licenses under the 1976
copyright act.
2
See www.copyright.gov/legislation. For an example of a bill whose enactment seems unlikely, see S
2591, 110th Cong. 2d Sess. (“To amend chapter 1 of title 17, United States Code, to provide an exemption
from exclusive rights in copyright for certain nonprofit organizations to display live football games . . .”).
3
See i2010: Digital Libraries High Level Expert Group – Copyright Subgroup, Final Report on Digital
Preservation, Orphan Works, and Out-of-Print Works (3 June 2008), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/newsroom/cf/document.cfm?action=display&doc_id=295
[hereinafter EU Copyright Subgroup Final Report] and reports cited infra, note 4.
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orphan works problem and prior attempts to resolve it in the US (I), will analyze the
current bills’ provisions (II), both with respect to the limitation of remedies that
constitutes the proposals’ centerpiece (A), and to the conditions required to qualify for
the limitation (B). I will also (III) compare the US proposals with current European
initiatives (A), and will assess the compatibility of the US proposals with international
treaty norms (B), as well as the cross-border consequences of inconsistent US and EU
orphan works regimes (C). I will conclude with some suggestions for amending the US
proposals to enhance their international compatibility and to reconcile the interests of
users more fully with those of the works’ creators.
I. Background
A. Nature of the problem
Would-be users who are unable to locate the copyright owner, but whose use or
exploitation would not qualify for a copyright limitation or exception (such as fair use),
must decide whether to renounce their projects or to incur the risk that the copyright
owner will reappear once the exploitation is underway, and will demand both injunctive
and substantial monetary relief in an ensuing infringement action. Potentially frustrated
users range widely, from commercial entities who seek to reissue out-of-print works or to
create new works based on “orphan” works, to cultural institutions, notably museums and
libraries, who seek to digitize works for preservation and educational purposes,4 to
individuals who seek to incorporate an “orphan” work in their webpage or blog. The US
Register of Copyrights has deemed the orphan works problem “pervasive.”5
The intensity of the problem varies with the nature of the work. Chains of title
may be more reliable and prevalent in some sectors, for example musical compositions

4

The European endeavors concerning orphan works have taken place primarily in the context of the
Commission’s “i2010 initiative” on digital libraries. See Communication “i2010: digital libraries” of 30
September 2005, COM(2005) 465 final; Commission Recommendation of 24 August 2006, on the
digitisation and online accessibility of cultural material and digital preservation (2006/585/EC), OJEU L
236/28

(31.8.2006),

Recital

10;

Recommendation

6(a)(c),

available

at

http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/activities/digital_libraries/doc/recommendation/recommendation_a
ugust06/en.pdf
5
See Statement of Marybeth Peters, Register of Copyrights, before the Subcommittee on Courts, the
Internet, and Intellectual Property, Committee on the Judiciary, United States House of Representatives,
110th
Congress,
2nd
Session,
March
13,
2008,
available
at
http://www.copyright.gov/docs/regstat031308.html [hereinafter Statement of Marybeth Peters]: “In fact,
the most striking aspect of orphan works is that the frustrations are pervasive in a way that many copyright
problems are not. When a copyright owner cannot be identified or is unlocatable, potential users abandon
important, productive projects, many of which would be beneficial to our national heritage. Scholars cannot
use the important letters, images and manuscripts they search out in archives or private homes, other than in
the limited manner permitted by fair use or the first sale doctrine. Publishers cannot recirculate works or
publish obscure materials that have been all but lost to the world. Museums are stymied in their creation of
exhibitions, books, websites and other educational programs, particularly when the project would include
the use of multiple works. Archives cannot make rare footage available to wider audiences. Documentary
filmmakers must exclude certain manuscripts, images, sound recordings and other important source
material from their films.”

2
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and commercially published print works, than in others, particularly photographs.6
Moreover, the number of unlocatable owners of currently unexploited works is likely to
increase with the expanded length of the copyright term,7 particularly if rightholders do
not keep copyright management information up to date.8 The number of potentially
unlocatable rightowners may also increase if the scope of transfers of rights excludes, or
is ambiguous regarding, different types of exploitations,9 particularly those enabled by
new technologies. If the author retained the rights to particular kinds of exploitations or
to new media, then locating the original publisher may not assist the would-be exploiter
whose use exceeds the scope of the original grant: If the publisher did not receive the
6

See, e.g., Agnieszka Vetulani, The Problem of Orphan Works in the EU: An overview of legislative
solutions and main actions in this field, report prepared for European Commission DG Information Society
and Media Unit E4: Digital Libraries and Public Sector Information, p. 7 (February 2008); Conseil
Supérieur de la Propriété Littéraire et Artistique, Commission sur les oeuvres orphelines, Rapport, pp. 1214 (19 March 2008); Comments of the American Society of Authors, Composers and Publishers Regarding
Orphan Works, OW0628-ASCAP.pdf (25 March 2005)(asserting no orphanage of non dramatic public
performance rights in musical compositions); College Art Association, Comments on Orphan Works
Notice of Inquiry, OW0647-CAA.pdf, pp. 7, 9-13 (25 March 2005) (emphasizing difficulty of identifying
copyright owner of photographs).
7
The 1998 “Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act” increased the copyright term from life-plus-50
years to life plus 70 years for works created as of 1978, and from 75 years from publication to 95 years
from publication for works published before 1978 (and, with respect to works published before 1964,
whose first terms of copyright had been renewed). See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301-304.
8
The relaxation of formalities that followed enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act and the 1988 Berne
Convention Implementation Act may also contribute to making it difficult to find the owner, as it is no
longer necessary to include a notice of copyright on publicly-distributed copies, nor to register the work
with the Copyright Office (though registration remains a prerequisite to suit if the work is of US origin, as
well as to certain remedies for all works) nor to renew the registration. See, e.g., Register of Copyrights,
Report on Orphan Works, 41-44 (2006) available at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-reportfull.pdf [hereinafter Copyright Office Report].
The extent to which the reduction of formalities is in fact a significant cause of the orphan works
problem may, however, be open to question. The copyright owner of a formalities-compliant work might
still prove unlocatable today because even mandatory copyright formalities did not require constant
updating. Thus, the information identifying the author or copyright owner of a work published with notice
in 1930 whose registration was renewed in 1958 (and whose copyright will endure until 2025) will today be
50 years old. The likelihood that the information in the 1958 renewal certificate remains accurate may not
be very high. Were recordation of transfers mandatory, then that formality could generate more useful and
reliable information concerning right holders, but recordation is not now, and was not previously, a
formality whose non-observance resulted in loss of copyright protection.
9
One consequence of “divisible” copyright, introduced in the 1976 Copyright Act, is to proliferate the
number of potential rightholders, as “Any of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, including any
subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred as provided by clause (1) and
owned separately,.” 17 USC § 201(d)(2). See Jessica Litman, Sharing and Stealing, 26 COMM/ENT 1, 18–
21 (2004):, “largely because of the adoption of divisibility of copyright, in many if not most cases, it can be
difficult and sometimes impossible to discover who the copyright owners of all of those rights are.” In
many European countries, “divisible” copyright has long been the rule, see e.g., France Code of intellectual
property, art. L. 131-3. On the relationship of multiple ownership of rights in works to the problem of
orphan works in the EU, see, e.g., Stef van Gompel, Unlocking the Potential of Pre-Existing Content: How
to Address the Issue of Orphan Works in Europe?, 38 IIC 669, 675-77 (2007).
A further complication, prevalent in Europe, arises from the changes in national borders
throughout the 20th century. As a result of the life-plus-70 term in the EU, a work first published in an
Eastern European country in 1915, whose author died in 1950, will still be protected until 2020, but its
country of origin may have changed several times since its initial publication. See Vetulani, supra note 6,
at 7.

3

relevant rights, it cannot grant them to the would-be exploiter.10 But if the authors (or
their heirs), who are the residual right holders, cannot be found, then the would-be
exploiter is faced with the same quandary as outlined above.
The problem of identifying the right owner, while perhaps exacerbated by the age
of the work, is not confined to older works; at least some of the potentially “orphaned”
works may be of recent vintage. Pictorial and graphic works, particularly photographs
and illustrations in digital form, may be at risk of “imposed orphanage,” because third
parties can digitize the works without identifying information, or if the works are already
in digital form, their identifying information can be removed and the works re-circulated
without apparent attribution.11
An orphan works regime must therefore aim to make works more widely
available by reducing the exploiter’s risk with respect to truly “orphaned” works while
avoiding the other extreme of thrusting “orphanage” upon works whose right holders can
in fact be found. The solution adopted must also be consistent with international
obligations under the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Accord. For the United States,
this means that orphan works legislation should not occasion back door reimposition of
formalities that condition the “enjoyment or exercise” of copyright.12 In theory, a bill
could “two-tier” reimposition of formalities, to limit the obligations to US works,13 but in
practice this solution may not significantly lessen exploiters’ burden, because in many
cases exploiters will have to spend resources in order to determine whether or not the
work was of US origin.
An additional Berne/TRIPs constraint concerns unpublished works. Article 9.2 of
the Berne Convention authorizes member states to provide exceptions and limitations to
the reproduction right “in certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not
conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the
legitimate interests of the author.” This provision does not explicitly exclude
unpublished works from the range of permissible exceptions, but the “legitimate interests
of the author” almost certainly include the interest in determining whether her work shall
be publicly disclosed. Berne Conv. article 10.1 supports this interpretation, because it
limits the quotation right to “a work which has already been lawfully made available to
the public.”14 It is difficult to imagine how the nonconsensual general disclosure of a
living author’s work would not “unreasonably prejudice” her legitimate interest.
10

Cf. Random House v. Rosetta Books, 150 F.Supp.2d 613 (SDNY 2001), aff’d., 283 F.3d 490 (2d Cir.
2002)(rejecting infringement claim by original publisher of paper-format books against publisher of
eBooks to whom the authors had granted their electronic rights).
11
See, e.g., Brad Holland & Cynthia Turner, Comments on Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry, OW0660Holland-Turner.pdf (24 March 2005); Stephen Morris, Professional Phtographers of America, Comments
on Orphan Works Notice of Inquiry, OW0642-PPA.pdf (25 March 2005).
12
See Berne Convention, art. 5.2.
13
Id, art. 5.4 (application of local law in country of origin). See, e.g., 17 USC § 411 (requiring copyright
registration of U.S. works as a prerequisite to initiation of an infringement action).
14
See Sam Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne
Convention and Beyond ¶¶ 10.37, 13.29, 13.63, 13.71 (2006) for further development of the proposition
that the Berne Convention implicitly incorporates a moral right of disclosure or divulgation.
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Nonetheless, it is not necessary to exclude all unpublished works (or all uses of them)
from an orphan works regime because not all “unpublished” works are undivulged; for
example, public performance is not a “publication” under US law.15 Moreover, the
legitimate interests of deceased authors with respect to their undivulged works may be
relatively attenuated compared to the public benefit to be gained from the orphaned
works’ post mortem disclosure. Similarly, these authors’ legitimate interests might not
be “unreasonably prejudiced” were the user to seek to digitize and preserve the
undisclosed works in a limited access archive. An orphan works regime which covered
all uses of all undisclosed works, however, may risk incompatibility with international
norms. In addition, an orphan works regime which does not take into account the desire
of some living authors that their works not be released could also be in tension with basic
US copyright policy. The “progress of knowledge” to which US copyright aspires is
achieved not only by putting works into circulation, but also by fostering conditions
conducive to creativity. A regime that facilitates unauthorized publication of private
journals and drafts may not favor authorial undertakings in the long run. That said, none
of the US bills on orphan works has yet made special provision for undivulged works.16
B. History of the Current Proposals17
In 2005, the Chairs and Ranking Members of the Senate and House committees
with jurisdiction over copyright legislation asked the Copyright Office to study and make
recommendations regarding orphan works. The Copyright Office’s report, issued in
2006, followed a period of public commentary (over 850 initial and reply comments were
submitted by individuals, cultural institutions, authors and authors’ societies, and
commercial copyright holders), roundtable discussions, and other consultations.18 The
Office considered a variety of approaches, including a government-administered
licensing program like the one implemented in Canada,19 but, consistent with the
predominant solution advanced in the submissions, recommended legislation limiting the
remedies against infringers whose use followed a “reasonably diligent search” for the
rightholders.20 The Office did not specifically define reasonable diligence, preferring to
leave the detail to the development of best practices in the various copyright sectors.21 A
bill incorporating the Office’s recommended language was proposed in 2006,22 but did
not pass. The bill’s lack of detail concerning what would constitute a “reasonably
diligent search,” drew opposition both from users seeking greater certainty that their
efforts would pass muster, and from some copyright owners, notably photographers and
15

See 17 USC § 101 (definition of “publication”).
See generally Vigdis Bronder, Note, Saving the Right Orphans: The Special Case of Unpublished
Orphan Works, 31 Colum. J.L. & Arts 409 (2008). By contrast, the Canadian response to the problem of
works whose copyright owners are “unlocatable,” excludes unpublished works, see Copyright Act of
Canada, sec. 77(1)(a).
17
Full documentation may be found at http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/.
18
See Copyright Office Report at 1 (2006).
19
Copyright Act of Canada, s. 77, see http://cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable/brochure-e.html See also EU
Copyright Subgroup Final Report at 112 (“Other regimes where a public body may issue the license”);
Vetulani, supra note 6, at 9-11; van Gompel, supra note 9, at 692-94.
20
See Copyright Office Report at 112-14.
21
Id. at 98-99.
22
HR 5439, 109 Cong., 2d sess. (2006), “Orphan Works Act of 2006”.
16

5

other visual artists, who feared that their digitized works could be rendered untraceable,
and thus vulnerable to orphan works limitations.23
The current House and Senate bills (which are similar but not identical), were
introduced in April 2008.24 Like the 2006 version, the current bills seek to alleviate the
risk of exploiting a work whose rightholder is unlocatable by limiting the remedies
available against the user in the event the rightholder reappears and initiates an
infringement action. The current proposals set out the conditions on availability of the
limitation on remedies in greater detail than the 2006 version, but still leave much to
private negotiation and business practice.
II. Presentation and Analysis of the 2008 Orphan Works proposed legislation
Because the cornerstone of the legislation is the limitation on remedies available
against a good-faith user who was unable to locate the rightholder(s), we will first
examine the bills’ remedial structure (A), and then will address the conditions on
availability of the remedies’ limitations (B). Both the House and Senate versions of the
proposal would create a new section 514 to Title 17 of the United States Code. Chapter
5, to which the orphan works legislation would be added, is the remedies provision of the
1976 Copyright Act.25
A. Limitation of remedies
The bills would not absolve the exploiter of liability; indeed, both bills label the
exploiter the “infringer.” This designation is consistent with the bills’ expectation that
the uses will not qualify for an exemption, such as fair use, or a more specific exception
or limitation. The proposals nonetheless specify that the bills do not affect any defenses
to copyright infringement, including fair use, nor do they supersede statutory licenses.26
The bills reduce the good-faith user’s risk both with respect to monetary (1) and
injunctive (2) relief. If the copyright owner does not reappear, then the orphan works
user will continue freely (in both senses of the word) to exploit the work.27
1. Monetary relief

23

See Statement of Marybeth Peters (describing response of copyright community to 2006 bill). For the
reactions of visual artists to the orphan works bill, see generally Illustrators’ Partnership Orphan Works
Blog, at http://ipaorphanworks.blogspot.com.
24
H.R. 5889, S. 2913, 110th Cong, 2d sess., introduced 24 April 2008.
25
See 17 USC §§ 501et seq.
26
See proposed § 514(e).
27
Compare i2010 Digital Libraries High Level Expert Group (HLG), Copyright Subgroup, Key Principles
for Orphan Works and Out-of-Print Works Databases (DB) and Rights Clearance Centres (RCC); i2010
Digital Libraries Copyright Subgroup’s Recommended Key Principles for Rights Clearance Centers and
Databases for Orphan Works (26 November 2007): both sets of Principles anticipate that the user will pay a
license fee to a Rights Clearance Center, regardless of whether the owner is ultimately found.
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Both bills would limit the exploiter’s exposure to monetary relief to “reasonable
compensation.”28 Section 514(a)(4) defines “reasonable compensation” as “the amount” a
willing buyer and seller would have agreed “with respect to the infringing use
immediately before the infringement began” (emphasis supplied). This language thus
appears to exclude the infringer’s profits (above and beyond profits “not taken into
account in computing the actual damages”29) from the measure of “reasonable
compensation.” It is unclear whether the text would also exclude a percentage-based
royalty: “the amount” of such a royalty cannot be reduced to a fixed sum because it will
be indeterminate before the work is exploited. Indeed, it will remain indeterminate
throughout the period of exploitation. Some kinds of uses, when licensed, may be paid
for on a one-off basis, but others would typically be authorized in return for royalties.30
If “the amount” can be understood to mean “the basis on which a sum will be calculated,”
then the term can encompass a percentage royalty, and thereby avoid some inequities and
possibly unintended consequences. For example, if the use proved enormously lucrative,
but its success could not have been anticipated, the “legal or beneficial owner”31 will not
share in the proceeds of the exploitation if “amount” means pre-determined fixed sum,
but will share in the proceeds if “amount” includes a stated percentage royalty.32
The “reasonable compensation” defined by the orphan works bill recalls the
Second Circuit’s analysis of “actual damages” under § 504(b) in Davis v The Gap.33
There, Judge Leval ruled that the $50 “fair market value” one-off licensing fee that the
plaintiff photographer would have charged, had the infringer sought a license to use the
plaintiff’s photograph in an advertisement, constituted proof of actual damages. But §
504 also allows the plaintiff to claim its share of the defendant’s profits if he can prove
them (which, on the facts of his case, Davis could not). By contrast, proposed § 514 does
not extend to profits. As a result, the difference in monetary relief could be significant if
the orphan work user’s exploitation turns out to be very profitable (though including a
percentage royalty within the concept of “reasonable compensation” may diminish the
discrepancy).
The most significant difference in remedies available to copyright owners of
orphan works compared with “parented” works is the unavailability of statutory damages.
If the work qualifies for statutory damages, then the copyright owner need not prove
actual losses (or infringer’s profits). Rather the statute allows the court to award between
$750 and $30,000 per work infringed, with an increase of up to $150,000 per work if the
28

See proposed §514(c)(1)(A).
17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
30
The Copyright Office Report appears to assume that “reasonable compensation” may be in the form of a
royalty as well as a single payment, see pp. 117-18.
31
The “beneficial owner” includes authors who assigned rights subject to continuing royalties, see H.R.
Rep. No. 94-1476, at 159 (1976); § 501(b) grants beneficial owners standing to sue for infringement.
32
In support of the latter construction, compare proposed § 514(c)(1)(B), which exempts certain non profit
users from payment of “reasonable compensation,” but requires that they share any “proceeds directly
attributable to the infringement.” If “the amount” of “reasonable compensation” owed by commercial
infringers excludes a share of proceeds, then non profit infringers could end up paying more than
commercial infringers; such a result seems unlikely to have been intended.
33
246 F.3d 152 (2d Cir. 2001) (Leval, J.). See Register of Copyrights, Report on Orphan Works at 116
29
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infringement was willful.34 If the “fair market value”-based “reasonable compensation”
for the orphan work would have been $50 (as was the case for Davis’ photograph), but
the rightholder could have claimed statutory damages, then the difference in monetary
relief would have been at least $700. The bills’ disallowance of statutory damages thus
could, at least in theory, significantly reduce the risk of exploiting orphan works. The
risk reduction may, however, in many cases be more theoretical than factual because of
the statutory conditions on qualifying for statutory damages. Statutory damages are
available only for works which were registered with the Copyright Office before the
commission of the infringement.35 With respect to the class of orphan works which lack
findable “parents” because the works were never registered for copyright, the
disqualification of statutory damages makes no difference because the owners of those
works could not have been awarded statutory damages in any event.36
2. Injunctive relief
Limiting monetary recovery may reasonably balance the interests of the good
faith infringer and those of the reappearing right holder (assuming the work is truly
“orphaned”) because injunctive relief remains available, including against non profit
users.37 Arguably, the availability of injunctive relief works a hardship on those users
who expended (and may not have recouped) resources in order engage in the
exploitation; perhaps therefore the reappearing author or right owner should be required
in effect to buy out the good faith infringer, by compensating him for his unrecouped
sunk costs. But a buy-out solution may err too far in the other direction, and could be in
tension with international obligations to cabin exceptions and limitations.38
The “orphan works” bill does not, in any event, disregard the reliance interests of
all good faith infringers because it sets out one very significant exception to the
availability of injunctive relief: where the infringer “has prepared or commenced
preparation of a work that recasts, transforms, adapts, or integrates the infringed work
with a significant amount of the infringer’s original expression,” the legal or beneficial
owner may obtain only “reasonable compensation,” and attribution, if the owner so

34

17 USC § 504(c).
Id. §412.
36
As discussed supra, note 8, it is not clear how many works are “orphaned” as a result of failure to
register, and how many lack “parents,” despite registration, because the information in the registration is
out of date and no other information pointing to the rightowners is available. See Copyright Office report,
supra note 8, at 21-36 (detailing “obstacles to identifying and locating copyright owners”)..
37
See proposed § 514(c)(2).
38
In Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1179, 1196 n. 5 (10th Cir. 2007), in assessing the constitutionality of 17
USC § 104A, which restores the copyrights in Berne Convention country works which fell into the public
domain in the US, notably for failure to comply with US formalities, the court suggested that the buy-out
approach might be a response to the problem of § 104A reliance parties constitutionally preferable to the
12-month grace period and sell-off allowance currently provided in § 104A(d)(2). But this footnote
endorsement occurred in the context of parties who had exploited works which had been in the public
domain. “Orphan works” are not in the public domain, and equating them with public domain works is
problematic.
35

8

requests.39 The infringer may not only continue to exploit the work, she may claim
copyright in it, despite its incorporation of infringing material.40
If “reasonable compensation” as defined does not include a continuing royalty,
then this provision provides for far less than a compulsory license. A one-off payment,
moreover, may favor the interests of second authors over the interests of the initial
authors to an extent incompatible with the international obligation not to “unreasonably
prejudice the legitimate interests of the author.” Hence another reason to avoid
construing “the amount” as a predetermined fixed sum. In that respect, one might look to
the “reliance party” provision of § 104A(d)(3), restoring US copyright in Berne
Convention and other foreign works. This provision concerns “existing derivative
works,” which appears to have inspired proposed § 514(c)(2)(B). Section 104A(d)(3)
allows continued exploitation for the duration of the restored work’s copyright term of a
derivative work created before 1995 and based on a copyright-restored work, subject to
“reasonable compensation.” Section 104A(h) does not define that term, but in the
absence of the parties’ agreement, § 104A(d)(3) directs a court to determine “the amount
of such compensation.” The factors § 104A(d)(3) articulates for the court’s consideration
are sufficiently open-ended that “the amount” contemplated by § 104A(d)(3) could well
include a percentage-based royalty, especially given the potentially long duration of the
derivative use.
The unavailability of injunctive relief with respect to derivative works poses other
problems as well. First, it does not accommodate the author’s or right owner’s moral and
economic interests in determining what kinds of derivative works to authorize. The
vague language “commenced preparation” and “significant amount of the infringer’s
original expression” could further erode the control over the work that the copyright law
normally confers with respect to uses that are neither “fair” nor subject to statutory
licenses. The bills as currently drafted, moreover, do not clearly require that the
“preparation” of the derivative work have “commenced” only after the infringer
performed and documented the “qualifying search” required in § 514(b)(1)(A).
Subsection (i) requires that the search be done “before the infringement began,” but if
preparation of a derivative work is merely “commenced,” has the infringement yet
begun? To avoid races to “commence” the maximum number of derivative works and
other absurd results, it will be necessary to interpret “commenced preparation” coextensively with “infringement began,” so that the qualifying search precedes any
commencement of preparation of any derivative work.

39

See proposed § 514(c)(2)(B).
See proposed § 514(f) (infringer who qualifies for limitation on remedies “shall not be denied copyright
protection in a compilation or derivative work on the basis that such compilation or derivative work
employs preexisting material that has been used unlawfully under this section.”). By contrast, under §
103(a), “protection for a work employing preexisting material in which copyright subsists does not extend
to any part of the work in which such material has been used unlawfully.” Thus, for example, a derivative
work based on a pre-existing non-orphaned work may not enjoy a copyright, see, e.g., Anderson v Stallone,
11 U.S.P.Q.2D 1161 (C.D.Cal.1989) (unauthorized screenplay based on previous “Rocky” films), while,
under the bills, the creator of a derivative work based on an orphan work may claim copyright in the
derivative work.

40
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Second, the preclusion of injunctive relief appears to be of unlimited duration,
thus obliging authors permanently to tolerate even derivative uses they find offensive or
that distort their works. The persistence of the unwanted derivative work has economic
consequences as well: because the author will not be able to prevent the continued
circulation of the derivative work, she will not be able to grant exclusive derivative work
rights to a third party. The bill thus potentially devalues the derivative work right.41
Third, the obligation to attribute the underlying work to the legal or beneficial
copyright owner does not necessarily include an obligation to attribute the underlying
work to its creator. The author may no longer be the copyright owner (or may never have
been an owner or even a statutory “author” because the creator was an employee for
hire42). If the author retains a percentage interest, she is a “beneficial owner,” and
therefore comes within the attribution obligation, but many authors transfer rights for a
lump sum (or no payment at all). The bills do not oblige the derivative works author to
credit these authors.43
B. Conditions on eligibility for limitation on remedies
The limitations on remedies apply only if the infringer has met the bills’ multiple
conditions. These require the alleged good faith infringer to perform and document a
“qualifying search,” despite which the copyright owner remained unlocatable; before
using the work, the good faith infringer must have filed a Notice of Use with the
Copyright Office, who will also prescribe a symbol of use to include with the use; the
good faith infringer must attribute the work to its copyright owner(s); and the infringer
must have consented to the jurisdiction of US courts in the event of an infringement
claim by a reappearing rightholder.44
Should the rightholder reappear and serve the infringer with a “notice of a claim
for infringement”,45 the infringer must also “negotiate reasonable compensation in good
faith with the copyright owner,” and “render payment of reasonable compensation in a
reasonably timely manner.”46 If the infringer neither negotiates nor pays, she will not
41

Worse, the author’s inalienable right under § 203 to terminate transfers of rights 35 years after the grant
right would not affect these derivative works: Even if the legal authorization of the derivative work were
treated as a transfer, the termination right does not reach derivative works created before the effective date
of the termination, § 203(b)(1). The termination right does cut off future derivative works, but, because
any new derivative works - including adaptations of the orphan works infringer’s earlier derivative work necessarily incorporate portions of the underlying no-longer-orphaned work, an orphan works infringer
would already not be entitled to make new derivative works once the copyright owner reappears and
objects.
42
See 17 USC §§ 101 (definition of work for hire), 201(b) (naming employer or certain commissioning
parties of a “work for hire” as the copyright owner).
43
To the same effect, see proposed § 514(b)(1)(A)(iii). By contrast, the 2006 version of the bill generally
required attribution of the author, see H.R. 5439, 109th Cong. 2d sess., ‘‘Orphan Works Act of
2006,’’§514(a)(1)(B). On the policy arguments for extending attribution requirements to authors, see
Section II.B.3, infra.
44
See proposed § 514((b)(1).
45
See proposed §514(a)(2), (b)(1)(B).
46
See proposed § 514(b)(1)(B).
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qualify for the limitation of remedies. By contrast, presumably, if the infringer negotiates
in good faith but fails to come to an agreement with the copyright owner on “reasonable
compensation,” the infringer’s failure to “render payment” of the amount the copyright
owner wanted will not oblige the infringer to pay more than the amount a court ultimately
sets as “reasonable compensation” in an ensuing infringement action (whether that
amount corresponds to what the infringer was willing to pay, or what the copyright owner
wanted, or something in between).
The overall purpose of this additional condition appears to be to keep
infringement claims out of the courts by in effect requiring settlement negotiations. If the
infringer negotiates in good faith, it may not be in the copyright owner’s interest to
litigate the claim because the costs of litigation are likely to exceed the “reasonable
compensation” that a court will award. If the infringer does not negotiate in good faith,
an infringement action may be worth the candle, at least if the infringer has made profits
that could be awarded to the copyright owner. But if the “orphan” work had not been
registered prior to the infringement (as may often be the case), the copyright owner will
qualify for neither statutory damages nor attorneys’ fees to offset the costs of the
litigation.
The following sections will analyze the requirements for a “qualifying search”
(1), as well as additional exclusions from the liability limitation (2).
1. “Qualifying Search”
The most important purpose of the §514(b) conditions on the remedies limitation
is to ensure that the works at issue truly are “orphaned.” The smaller the universe of
“orphan” works, the less likely that copyright owners will reappear, and the less likely,
therefore, that negotiations -- and potentially ensuing judicial second-guessing -- over
what constitutes “reasonable compensation” will need to take place. The bills’ provisions
on “qualifying searches” are supposed to carry out the task of ensuring that specious
“orphans” do not end up in the pool of parentless works whose unauthorized exploitation
the bills seek to encourage. Making sure that the “orphan” category is accurately
circumscribed is essential to the bill’s fairness and to its consistency with international
norms. In this respect, it is important to appreciate that the bill is not designed to shortcut title searching. An “orphan work” is not one whose author or right holder is costly or
onerous to find; it is one whose rightholder, despite the user’s expenditure of effort and
resources, remains unlocatable. That said, a side benefit of the bill may be to make
rights-clearance easier, and, one may hope, cheaper, for all users of all works, whether or
not “orphaned,” by publicizing and systematizing the information a would-be user should
be gathering with respect to any work whose right holders are not already known to the
user, and by encouraging the development of professional title searching businesses, as
well as of right holder databases and rights-clearance guidelines of interested associations
and organizations.47

47

The EU Copyright Subgroup Final Report stresses the importance of facilitating rights clearance and of
developing databases of information leading to rightholders. See sections 5.1, 5.5, 9.1, 9.2, 9.4. See also
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The bills define a “qualifying search” as a “diligent effort to locate the owner of
the infringed copyright.”48 Diligence is assessed with reference, inter alia, to “best
practices” collected by Copyright Office.49 The search may include recourse to paid
search services.50 To assist searching, section 3 of the bills provides that the Copyright
Office is to keep a database of pictorial, graphic and sculptural works, and the effective
date of the act, with respect to those works, is delayed by four years (1/1/09 for other
works; 1/1/13 for pictorial, graphic and sculptural works). One may infer that these
provisions, which did not exist in the 2006 version of the bill, are designed to reassure
photographers and other visual artists that their works will not be vulnerable to enforced
“orphanage.” It is worth noting that where registration, at $45 per work, can entail
significant costs for photographers and illustrators, the database of pictorial, graphic and
sculptural works does not appear to be established at the creators’ expense, and therefore
removes the disincentive to registration that resulted from the fee required under § 408.51
The bill does not provide much detail concerning the standards for a “qualifying
search,” probably because Congress may have determined that it is not the most
competent institution to articulate standards which are likely to vary by creative sector as
well as by the nature of the use,52 and to evolve with technology. The Copyright Office
is more institutionally equipped than Congress to gather the relevant information and to
specify the “materials and standards” requisite to searching,53 particularly in a way that
timely responds to changing conditions.
Because the “facts relevant to that search” affect the standard of “reasonable and
appropriate” diligence,54 the question arises whether the bills may therefore allow for a
more or less exigent standard depending on the nature of the user as well as the use. For
example, one may be concerned that the required diligence of the search will prove
beyond the means of non professional exploiters. While at first blush a sliding scale of
diligence depending on the nature of the user would seem both reasonable and consistent
with the bills’ overall goals to favor the exploitation of orphan works, providing a more
forgiving standard for the benefit of non professional (or modest professional) users
would be problematic for at least two reasons. First, variable levels of diligence would
render the same work (or same rights in the work) “orphaned” as to some users but not as
to others. This result is in tension with another goal of the bills, to ensure that the
limitations on liability pertain only to works that are truly orphaned. Unlike the somei2010 Digital Libraries Copyright Subgroup’s Recommended Key Principles for Rights Clearance Centers
and Databases for Orphan Works.
48
See proposed § 514(b)(2)(A)(i).
49
See proposed § 514(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), § 514(b)(2) (B)(i).
50
See proposed § 514(a)(1)(D). Cf. Copyright Subgroup Final Report at 15, “Diligent search guidelines”
“Any regulatory initiative should refrain from prescribing minimum search steps or information sources to
be consulted, due to rapidly changing information sources and search techniques.”
51
It is, however, possible for a single fee to make a group registration of up to 750 photographs by the
same photographer if all were published within the same calendar year, and all photographs have the same
copyright claimant, see http://www.copyright.gov/fls/fl124.html.
52
See proposed § 514(a)(1)(D).
53
See proposed § 514 (b)(2)(B)(ii).
54
See proposed 514(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I).
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time prisoners of the Pirates of Penzance, the bills should not encourage opportunistic
and occasional orphanage.55 Second, even assuming that particular classes of good faith
users are in fact unable to devote the resources necessary to locating the rightholders (and
assuming that their location in fact requires substantial expenditure of resources), the
bills’ provision for injunction-proof derivative works56 would mean that the reappearing
copyright holders would be unable to prevent the persistence of even those adaptations of
their works that violate their integrity or that, albeit non commercial in their own right,
nonetheless compete with prospective licensed derivative works.57 This consequence
suggests that the level of diligence should be set consistently high. A lower bar may risk
incompatibility with international norms restricting limitations on copyright.
The bills do not resolve the problem; if anything, they invite a multiplicity of
potentially conflicting standards because they list among “materials and standards”
“industry practices and guidelines of associations and organizations.”58 Different
associations and organizations may propose different levels of diligence (and expense), as
comparison of the “Principles for User Generated Content Services,” promulgated by a
group of copyright owners and commercial websites (including Viacom, Disney,
Microsoft, Veoh and MySpace)59 and the “Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video
Content,” proposed by a group of user-oriented organizations (including the Electronic
Frontier Foundation and Public Knowledge)60 illustrate in the context of guidelines for
the removal of allegedly infringing material from user-generated content websites. In
instructing the Copyright Office to “maintain . . . current statements of best practices for
conducting and documenting a search,”61 and to “from time to time, consider materials
and standards that may be relevant to the requirements for a qualifying search,”62 the bills
may not clearly express Congressional intent that the Copyright Office select from among
competing standards. One might nonetheless infer that intent from proposed §
514(b)(2)(A)(ii)(II), which requires the infringer to have “employed the applicable best
practices maintained by the Register of Copyrights,” because without a Copyright Office
selection, it may be difficult to determine which of the potentially many competing
standards was “applicable.” On the other hand, the Copyright Office might be reluctant
to undertake a normative task that Congress has not clearly delegated, and which might
considerably reduce the flexibility and informativeness of the “best practices” enterprise.

55

W.S. Gilbert and Arthur Sullivan, The Pirates of Penzance, Act I, finale, “For he is an orphan boy,
Hurrah for the orphan boy. And it is, it is a glorious thing to be an orphan boy.” (prisoners captured by the
Pirates of Penzance obtain their release by pretending to be orphans).
56
See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
57
If the reappearing copyright owner cannot obtain an injunction against the continued availability of these
derivative works, it would also follow that the copyright owner would be unable to compel the user’s
internet service provider to remove or block access to the derivative work under § 512(c).
58
See proposed § 514(a)(1)(C).
59
User Generated Content Principles, Principles for User Generated Content Services,
http://www.ugcprinciples.com
60
Electronic Frontier Foundation, Fair Use Principles for User Generated Video Content,
http://www.eff.org/files/UGC_Fair_Use_Best_Practices_0.pdf
61
See proposed §514((b)(2)(B)(i).
62
See proposed § 514(b)(2)(B)(ii).
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At the very least, the bill makes clear that absence of identifying information on
“a particular copy or phonorecord . . . is not sufficient to meet the conditions” of a
qualifying search.63 One may infer that this caution, which also appeared in the 2006
version,64 was included at the behest of photographers, visual artists, and other creators
who fear that third party removal of identifying information and recirculation of
anonymized copies will inappropriately impose “orphanage” upon their works.65
In certain cases, however, the level of diligence of the search for rightholders does
not matter, because the bills exclude certain uses from the limitation on remedies.
2. Exclusions from the limitation on remedies
a. Useful Articles
Proposed section 514(d) provides that the limitation on remedies is not available
to those who fix the work “in or on a useful article that is offered for sale or other
distribution to the public.” This provision, which was not in the 2006 version, is an
important concession to visual artists. Section 113(a) of the copyright act gives authors
of pictorial, graphic or sculptural works the exclusive “right to reproduce the work in or
on any kind of article, whether useful or otherwise.” As a result, authors of pictorial,
graphic and sculptural works control the market for t-shirts, coffee mugs, and other
merchandizing properties that incorporate images of their work. These kinds of
reproductions afford a significant source of income to many visual artists. Already
concerned that their works might be unduly “orphaned,” visual artists also, one may infer,
feared having to compete with unauthorized users of their work in a knick-knack market
that may not be infinitely expandable. Keeping unauthorized users out of this sector,
moreover, does little if any violence to the policies underlying the orphan works bill, to
encourage reissuing and creative reuse of works too long lying fallow. Republishing or
dramatizing an out of print novel promote the progress of knowledge without
compromising the author’s incentives (at least not if the work is truly orphaned). The
educational and cultural benefits from affixing an obscure photograph to a beer stein or
shower curtain may well be of a lesser order. The costs to visual artists of improper
63

See proposed § 514(b)(2)(A)(iii).
See H.R. 5439, 109th Cong., 2d sess. §514(a)(2)(B)(i)(II).
65
The House version of the bill also includes a “Notice of Use Archive” - To qualify for the limitation on
remedies, the infringer must also file a notice of use, which the Copyright Office is instructed to include in
an archive which it is to create and maintain, see H.R. 5439, §514(b)(3). Some may find it ironic that while
the copyright owner need no longer register in order to obtain copyright protection, a good faith infringer of
an orphan work must in effect register in order to obtain protection against the full panoply of copyright
remedies. In fact, the imbalance is less stark than might appear, as US copyright owners must register in
order to enforce their copyrights, and all copyright owners must register in order to qualify for the full
panoply of remedies. The purpose of the archive appears to be to assist reappearing rightholders to identify
unauthorized users, and then to enter into negotiations with them. The bill provides that the archive may
not be open to the public without restriction, as the Copyright Office is to specify the conditions under
which the information will be furnished, §514(b)(3). These restrictions may be necessary to preserve the
confidentiality of users’ business plans, and potentially to protect small or independent users against large
users’ acquiring “inspiration” from perusing others’ projects to reissue or adapt particular works, and then
marshalling their superior resources to become the first to market the work.
64
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orphanage should the bill not exclude useful articles may therefore be higher than the loss
to the public of those uses.
b. Federated States and State officials
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.,66 and Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Savings Bank,67 holding the fifty federated States immune from
suits for damages under the Lanham Trademarks Act and the Patent Act, respectively, it
is generally assumed that the States may also invoke sovereign immunity under the 11th
Amendment to defeat any claim for monetary relief under the Copyright Act.68 States
may waive sovereign immunity, however, and State officials remain subject to suits for
injunctive relief under the doctrine of Ex parte Young.69 When the State or its officials
are the infringer, the bill conditions the limitation on injunctive relief against infringers
who have commenced or prepared derivative works on the State’s waiver of sovereign
immunity by agreeing to be sued for damages, or by making an “enforceable promise to
pay reasonable compensation.”70 Without this condition, the right holder would be
remediless, because the bill would deny injunctive relief, but the state would escape the
quid pro quo of monetary relief. With this condition, either the State pays, and may
continue distributing the derivative work, or it refuses payment, and then is subject to
injunctive relief against the continued distribution of the derivative work.
III. Comparative and International Law Considerations
A.

EU Initiatives

The proposed US response to the orphan works problem represents one of three
general approaches.71 In lieu of limiting liability, an orphan works regime could be based
on a centrally-administered non exclusive compulsory license, or, in countries where
collective licensing societies represent creators across copyright sectors, an “extended
collective license” covering all creators of the relevant subject matter, even when these
creators cannot be found or have not specifically given their accord.72 Collective
copyright management organizations (such as ASCAP and BMI) are not sufficiently
pervasive in the US for the last of the three to be feasible, and neither the Copyright
Office nor most of the interested parties in the US favored a compulsory license.73 By
contrast, in the European Union, a limitation of liability system is probably barred by the
66

527 U.S. 666 (1999).
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
68
See, e.g., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 204 F.3d 601 (5th Cir.2000).
69
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
70
See proposed § 514(c)(2)(C).
71
The approaches are detailed in Vetulani, supra note 6, at 8-14.
72
On extended collective licenses, see generally Gunnar Karnell Extended Collective License Clauses and
Agreements in Nordic Copyright Law, 10 Colum.-VLA J. L. & the Arts 73 (1985); Tarja KoskinnenOlsson, Collective Management in the Nordic Countries, in Daniel Gervais, ed., Collective Management of
Copyright and Related Rights 257 (2006).
73
See supra note 20.
67
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2001 EU Information Society Directive which strictly constrains the exceptions and
limitations member States may impose.74
One of the approaches indicated by the i2010 Digital Libraries High Level Expert
Group (HLG), Copyright Subgroup combines features of the extended collective license
and the centrally administered license. The Copyright Subgroup’s “Recommended Key
Principles for Rights Clearance Centers and Databases for Orphan Works” recommend
that Member States encourage rightholders to vest license-granting authority in national
Rights Clearance Centers (RCC), which would grant orphan works licenses, in
cooperation with national authors’ collective management organizations regarding
licensing policies, criteria and fees.75 Unlike a true compulsory license, the RCC license
“must provide for its replacement by a licence with the pertinent rightholder or his/her
representative and include a take down procedure when the rightholder has been
identified and/or located and normal rights clearance mechanisms may be used.”76
Nonetheless, the i2010 Digital Libraries High Level Expert Group (HLG), Copyright
Subgroup’s recommendations focus principally on improving and systematizing
ownership information in order to diminish as much as possible the class of works
accurately deemed “orphan,” and accordingly facilitate rights clearance generally.77 The
US orphan works bills of course strive toward the same goal but without the same
framework of copyright management organizations and without the Copyright
Subgroup’s extensive guidelines for the structure and content of rights management
databases.
Were the US and EU to enact divergent orphan works regimes, problems of
international compatibility may arise, for example because an orphan work made
available in or from the US may also become accessible in the EU, and vice versa.
Within the EU, the Copyright Subgroup repeatedly emphasized the need for
“interoperability” across Member States, so that, for example, national Rights Clearance
Centers would “interlink,”78 and Member States would devise common “diligent search”
criteria.79 Acknowledging that the orphan works problem extends beyond the EU, the
Copyright Subgroup also recommended that Member States recognize other States’
diligent search criteria (the recommendation carries the unstated assumption that these
will be sufficiently rigorous, even if not identical to the criteria evolved in the EU).80
While the evolution of compatible diligent search criteria seems both possible and
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Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonization of certain aspects of copyrightt and related rights in the information society, OJ L 167/10 of
22 June 2001, art. 5 (restricting exceptions and limitations); See Vetulani, supra note 6, at 14.
75
See Rights Clearance Centre (RCC) Key Principles, 2. Licensing, Key Principles, supra note 27, at 6.
76
Id., 1. Policy. The Key Principles further specify, however, “Such replacement procedure must take due
account of the needs of the library/archive/museum or other user, institutional or commercial, that has been
allowed to digitise and/or make available under the RCC orphan works licence.”
77
Id., at 4-5 (“Data Bases (DB) Key Principles”); see supra note 47,.
78
See Rights Clearance Centre (RCC) Key Principles, 6. Interoperability, supra note 27, at 7; Copyright
Subgroup Final Report at 10, 26.
79
Copyright Subgroup Final Report at 14.
80
Id.
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desirable, comity issues may prove more complex with respect to the solutions adopted
once a work is labeled “orphan.”
B.

Consistency of the US Proposals with International Norms

If the work that is the object of a US user’s diligent search is a work of European
origin - or, for that matter, is a work from any other non-US WTO or Berne Convention
member, then the work is entitled in the US to those instruments’ minimum protections.
It therefore becomes necessary to determine whether the proposed U.S. liability
limitations are consistent with those norms. The US proposals may run afoul of EU
restrictions because the US proposals, by denying injunctive relief against creators of
derivative works, would impose a class of compulsory licenses that neither the EU
regulations, nor perhaps the Berne Convention,81 authorize. There may also be Bernecompatibility problems regarding the inclusion of non-divulged works in the proposed
orphan works regime. By contrast, the liability limitations respecting damages awards
probably are consistent with EU norms because the reappearing copyright owner remains
entitled to such actual damages as she can prove. Statutory damages are not part of the
EU or Berne copyright landscape, so their preclusion by the US orphan works proposals
should not be problematic.
The exclusion of the orphan work infringer’s profits may be more ambiguous.
The Berne Convention leaves remedies to countries of protection,82 although the
Convention’s restrictions on the imposition of compulsory licenses83 suggest that member
States are expected to make injunctive relief available in most cases. By contrast,
nothing in the Berne text addresses the scope of monetary relief, though, again, one might
contend that the Convention assumes that member States will at least award damages
adequate to compensate for the injury resulting from infringement of the copyright.
Thus, if profits “are taken into account in computing the actual damages,”84 for example
in calculating the royalty owed to the copyright owner, they should be considered within
the realm of actual damages, and therefore within the minimum remedies available to the
copyright owner. As discussed earlier, it can be argued that the Orphan Works bills do
not exclude awards of defendant’s profits when these are employed as a measure of
actual damages. The US Copyright Act also provides for profits “attributable to the
infringement” over and above the profits calculated within actual damages;85 these,
however, may be considered a kind of additional “disgorgement” remedy distinct from
compensating the copyright owner for its losses. As such, they might exceed the
minimum remedies implicit in the Berne Convention, and their exclusion from the
remedies available to copyright owners of orphan works may not violate Berne norms.
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See Reply Comments of Profs. Jane C. Ginsburg and Paul Goldstein, OWR0107.pdf at 10.
See Berne Convention art. 5.2.
83
See id. arts. 9.2, 11bis2, 13.
84
See 17 U.S.C. § 504(b).
85
Id.
82
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Unlike the Berne Convention, the TRIPs accord sets out minimum standards for
remedies for violations of intellectual property rights. Article 45 addresses damages.86
Article 45.1 requires payment of “damages adequate to compensate for the injury the
right holder has suffered because of an infringement” when the infringer knows or should
know he or she is infringing. Article 45.2 addresses unknowing infringement, and
permits member States to “authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits
and/or payment of pre-established damages.” This language leaves open the question
whether the damages required by art. 45.1 implicitly include profits. Article 45’s failure
to specify profits in the mandatory scope of recovery for willful infringement, while
allowing (without requiring) them in the case of innocent infringement should probably
be understood to mean that profits may be allowed as compensation for both willful and
innocent infringement, but are required for neither. Arguably, because the structure of
the article suggests that the mandatory monetary recovery for innocent infringement
should be less than for knowing infringement, it could follow that, with respect to
knowing infringement, profits are implicitly included within the mandatory scope. This
reading is nonetheless improbable because art. 45.2 also includes “pre-established
damages” within the permissible scope of remedies available against innocent infringers,
but “pre-established damages,” such as the U.S. Copyright Act’s statutory damages,87 are
relatively uncommon, and therefore are unlikely to be the object of a mandatory
international norm. If this analysis is correct, then the US bills’ limitations on monetary
relief would pass international muster.
C.

Whose Orphan Works Regime(s) Applies?

Even assuming that the orphan works solutions ultimately adopted in the US and
the EU all meet Berne and TRIPs norms, practical cross-border issues remain. When an
orphan work is made available from one country to the public in another, which country’s
(or countries’) orphan works regime applies? Does it suffice to meet the diligent search
criteria and, if applicable, license fees of the country from which the communication
originates, or must the person making the communication also conform to the
prerequisites and fees (if any) of the countries in which members of the public access the
work? Under a traditionally territorialist approach to copyright infringement, the law(s)
of the country(ies) in which the damage occurs – the countries of receipt – would govern,
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Article 45 of the TRIPs agreement sets out Member State minimum obligations respecting monetary
compensation:
Damages
1.
The judicial authorities shall have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right
holder damages adequate to compensate for the injury the right holder has suffered because of an
infringement of that person’s intellectual property right by an infringer who knowingly, or with
reasonable grounds to know, engaged in infringing activity.
2.
The judicial authorities shall also have the authority to order the infringer to pay the right
holder expenses, which may include appropriate attorney's fees. In appropriate cases, Members
may authorize the judicial authorities to order recovery of profits and/or payment of preestablished damages even where the infringer did not knowingly, or with reasonable grounds to
know, engage in infringing activity.
87
17 USC § 504(c).
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thus obliging the off-shore entrepreneur to clear rights for each country to which the work
will be sent.88
An analysis of the currently fraught issue of which law governs the transnational
“making available” of works of authorship,89 is beyond the scope of this comment. For
present purposes, let us first assume the traditional approach prevails; a license granted
by a Rights Clearance Center established in an EU Member State would not itself cover
exploitation in the US. But extant US collective licensing societies may be able to enter
into reciprocal agreements with a national RCC (or the US societies’ current reciprocal
agreements with other national collective management organizations may automatically
carry over to the RCCs). On the other hand, diligently searching exploiters of works not
represented by US collective management organizations (works which may constitute the
bulk of works deemed “orphan”) would have to proceed piecemeal, paying the license
fees (if any) for EU countries, and paying nothing for the US, pending reappearance of
the US rightholder(s).90 In the latter event, the exploiter would pay “fair compensation”
for US uses; the amount of the payment being determined by litigation should
negotiations with the rightholder fail. In the case of an exploitation originating in the US,
but also made available in the EU, under the territorialist approach, the exploiter would
not be able to rely solely on the US regime, and the various EU Rights Clearance Centers
(or other authorities, if any, established to regulate orphan works in those States) would
have authority to issue licenses for their respective territories.
By contrast, were the applicable law that of the country from which (rather than to
which) the works are made available, the orphan works solution would be considerably
simplified, but it would be necessary for all the countries concerned to adhere to the same
choice of law rule. For example, even if US courts were to adopt a point-of-origin choice
of law, that will not help a US exploiter who makes orphan works available from the US
to EU member States if the choice of law rule in the EU States designates the laws of the
countries of receipt.
88

WIPO Copyright Treaty, art. 8, which enunciates the making available right, may implicitly designate the
country of receipt of the communication as the State in which the copyright-triggering act occurs, see Sam
Ricketson and Jane C. Ginsburg, International Copyright and Neighbouring Rights: The Berne Convention
and Beyond ¶20.25, although it may also be argued that the WIPO treaty leaves it to member States to
determine whether the applicable law is that of the country of emission or that (those) of the country(ies) of
receipt, see Jane C. Ginsburg, The (New?) Right of Making Available to the Public, in Lionel Bently and
David Vaver, eds., Intellectual Property in the New Millennium, Essays in Honour of Willliam R. Cornish
234, 236-37 (2004). See also American Law Institute, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES GOVERNING
JURISDICTION, CHOICE OF LAW, AND JUDGMENTS IN TRANSNATIONAL DISPUTES § 301(1)(b) (“law of each
State for which protection is sought”) and Comment d (law of countries of receipt of an internet
transmission); Art. 8(1) of the EC Rome II Regulation (for intellectual property rights other than a “unitary
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infringement).
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See, e.g., SAIF v Google, TGI Paris, decision of 20 May 2008, http://www.legalis.net/jurisprudencedecision.php3?id_article=2342.
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By the same token, the compulsory licenses issued by the Canadian Copyright Board for the exploitation
of works whose rightholders are “unlocatable” cover only Canadian exploitations. See Copyright Board of
Canada, Unlocatable Copyright Owners, Brochure, http://www.cb-cda.gc.ca/unlocatable/brochure-e.html
(“A licence from the Board is only valid in Canada. Outside Canada, you are bound by the laws of each
country in which you use that work, even if the author is Canadian.”).
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Conclusion: Suggested Amendments to the US Proposals
Even if territorial compensation can be worked out, cross-border problems will
nonetheless persist if the remedies available to foreign authors in a given territory do not
meet Berne-TRIPs minima. As suggested above, the US proposals’ injunction-proof
derivative works may not be compatible with the Conventions’ restrictions on
compulsory licenses. Thus, it may be necessary for the US legislation to devise another
solution, such as an extended grace period, perhaps with some monetary compensation to
the derivative works creator (offset by the “fair compensation” the derivative works
creator would owe to the reappearing rightholder(s)), if the creator or place of first
publication of the work whose rightholder(s) reappear turn out to be a non-US Berne or
TRIPs country.91 Indeed, for the reasons advanced earlier, such a reconciliation of the
interests of the orphan works rightowner(s) and the derivative works creator regardless of
the orphan work’s country of origin may well be preferable to the current US proposals.
Other amendments that I would urge focus more specifically on authors. The
current bills either incorrectly conflate authors with copyright owners (e.g., with respect
to attribution), or simply disregard those authors who are not legal or beneficial owners
of copyright. In addition to including the actual work’s creator as a recipient of
attribution (whether or not she is a legal or beneficial copyright owner), the bills should
add authors to the objects of a qualifying search. (Even without an amendment, however,
the Copyright Office could include the identification of and search for authors in its
collections of best practices.)
Arguably, the orphan works bill should not be the occasion to infiltrate a moral
right of attribution into a copyright act which on the whole has failed to welcome that
authorial interest.92 The scope of the attribution right in the § 106A Visual Artists’
Rights Act for works of visual art is extremely limited, and the § 1202 protections against
removal or alteration of “copyright management information” have not opened much of a
back door for author’s attribution rights, either.93 But there are orphan works regimepertinent benefits to including authors within an attribution requirement for exploitation
of orphaned works. First, as the old license/new media problem shows, the author may in
fact be the relevant right holder; including the author within the mandatory scope of a
“qualifying search” will allow the user to cover her bases in the event that the apparent
right holder, e.g., the book publisher, does not hold the relevant rights. Second, authors
may have contractual interests in works in which they have not retained copyright rights.
For example, an author who has granted rights may have reserved a right of consultation
91

The US Copyright Act defines a “United States work,” for purposes of imposition of the section 411
formality making registration a prerequisite to an infringement action, as one first or simultaneously
published in the US, or, for unpublished works, all of whose authors are US nationals, domiciliaries or
habitual residents, 17 U.S.C. § 101. See also, Berne Conv. art 5(4) (detailing a work’s “country of origin”).
92
But cf. Jacobsen v Katzer, -- F.3d –, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 17161 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (holding that breach
of the online open source “Artistic License,” conditioning grant of non exclusive rights on attribution of
authorship, infringed the software author’s copyright even though attribution is not an exclusive right under
copyright).
93
See, e.g., Textile Secrets International, Inc. v. Ya–Ya Brand Inc. 524 F.Supp.2d 1184 (C.D.Cal.2007).
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or approval of any licenses the grantee enters into.94 Because the current text of the bills
does not require a diligent effort to locate the author if the author is not the right holder,
an orphan works user would encounter fewer constraints than would the original grantee
or its licensees.
Finally, for the reasons discussed earlier, the bills should exclude “orphan works”
which have never been disclosed to the public, and whose authors are still living. The
bill may adopt the copyright act’s “presumption as to author’s death”95 in this regard,
thus subjecting undisclosed works of historical interest to the orphan works regime while
preserving the living author’s interests in privacy and artistic integrity.

94
95

Thanks to Ann Chaitowitz, Executive Director, Future of Music Coalition, for this observation.
17 USC § 302(e).
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